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BOOK REVIEWS
THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES:

A STUDY

IN LAW AND ECONOMICS.

By Ken-

neth G. Elzinga and William Breit. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1976. Pp. xxi, 160. $10.00.
Reviewed by George A. Hay*
The Antitrust Penalties was published in 1976. Its main message is that the only efficient antitrust penalty is a heavy fine and
that incarceration comes out poorly by any benefit-cost standard.
Later that year, in a celebrated and possibly unprecedented appearance, newly appointed Assistant Attorney General Donald I. Baker
argued before a federal district judge that jail sentences were the
appropriate penalty for a group of defendants who had just been
convicted in one of the major price-fixing cases of the past twenty
years. Fines, he suggested, offered insufficient deterrence for future
would-be criminals. Moreover, after that appearance, the call for
jail sentences in price-fixing cases became the dominant theme in
Baker's brief but active tenure.' Thus the evidence is clear that
Elzinga and Breit's missionary expedition had failed to convert the
chief antitrust enforcement official. Why the attempted conversion
thus far has failed is a question this review will address.
Because the book is quite brief (153 pages) and very well written, most readers, including noneconomists, will find it easy reading. Indeed the book is really a single idea expanded to book length
by incorporating some interesting historical material. The first
chapter introduces the concept of antitrust action as a public good
in which the elimination of monopoly pricing by one party provides
nonexcludable benefits to many others. Hence, absent some artificially created incentives, private parties have little or no incentive
to undertake the task. Governmental provision of the public good
is thereby justified or at least explained. There follows a brief section reminding us that, since the elimination of monopoly pricing
* Visiting Professor of Law and Economics, Cornell University. B.S., 1963, LeMoyne
College; M.A., 1967, Ph.D., 1969, Northwestern University. The author is on leave from his
position as Director of Economics for the Antitrust Division of the United States Department
of Justice. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent the official
position of the Department. The helpful comments of Robert J. Reynolds are gratefully
acknowledged.
1. See, e.g., To Make the Penalty Fit the Crime: How to Sentence Antitrust Felons,
Address by Donald I. Baker before the Tenth New England Antitrust Conference (Boston,
Nov. 20, 1976) (on file at the Vanderbilt Law Review).
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is expensive, efficiency does not require its complete elimination but
merely its reduction to the point at which marginal benefits equal
marginal costs.
The chapter is not central to the rest of the book, since the
remainder is designed to show how to lower the cost of any given
level of enforcement or, at best, to eliminate all monopoly pricing
at zero cost. Hence, notions concerning the optimal level of enforcement are not subsequently used. In the real world, of course, not all
monopoly pricing can be eliminated, so some fascinating and important issues remain regarding the optimal level of antitrust resources
and, perhaps more interestingly, the optimal strategy for using any
given level of resources. Should investigatory resources be focused
on big (or concentrated, or both) industries, on shady areas of the
law (i.e., possible precedent-setting cases), or on situations sugor tips? These questions are not dealt with in
gested by complaints
2
this brief chapter.
The second chapter briefly surveys the penalties considered but
not accepted during the drafting of the Sherman Act. Much of the
chapter is taken, with appropriate citations, from the classic by
Thorelli. 3 The penalties considered ranged from the Draconian-denying "trusts" the use of the mails or the federal
courts-to the likely innocuous measure of simply publicizing the
fact of an antitrust violation. What is striking about the early statements cited by the authors, and to some extent about their own
subsequent discussion, is the rather simple-minded view of the
Sherman Act violator as a "trust." Penalties that may have been
appropriate for dealing with Standard Oil in 1911 hardly seem realistic when dealing with some of the typical Sherman Act violations
of 1978-a restrictive patent license, a vertical territorial restriction,
or a tying clause. Closer attention to the wide variety of possible
violations and its implications for the appropriate set of penalties
would have improved and probably would have altered some of the
authors' discussion.
The third chapter examines, primarily from a historical
perspective, the public action penalties-incarceration, structural
relief, and fines. The authors briefly survey the use of incarceration
as a penalty and find, as most are aware, that it is almost never
2. See also Statistical Studies of Antitrust Enforcement: A Critique, Address to the
American Statistical Association by Robert T. Masson & Robert J. Reynolds (1977) (on file
at the Vanderbilt Law Review).
3. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION
(1955).
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imposed in Sherman Act cases and that when it is imposed the
length of the actual incarceration rarely exceeds thirty days (in most
cases the sentence is suspended). This information is presented
nicely in a table showing all cases since 1966 in which jail has been
an element of the sentence. From 1966 to 1974 jail or probation was
an element of the sentence in only eighteen cases, and individuals
actually served time in only seven cases.
These grim (from an enforcer's viewpoint) statistics lead the
authors to speculate on judicial reluctance to incarcerate individuals found guilty of Sherman Act violations. Their explanation is that
in cases involving large corporations courts have difficulty pinpointing guilt above the level of those who overtly carry out the antitrust
violations.
But until judges and juries are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
well-dressed, wealthy, articulate pillar of the community facing them is in
actuality the real instigator and director of a conspiracy to cut back production, rig prices, and rob consumers and taxpayers just as effectively as a common mugger or bank robber, it is unlikely that prison sentences often will be
imposed for violations of the antitrust laws.4

The logic of their argument, therefore, is that, because of the
difficulty in pinpointing guilt, judges are reluctant to impose jail
sentences and, since jail sentences are unlikely to be imposed, the
possibility of jail does not serve as an effective deterrent. Speculating on the collective thinking of judges is chancy, and the authors
offer no evidence, either statistical or anecdotal, in support of their
hypothesis. My own view is that they may have missed the target,
in part because I suspect that individual judges differ dramatically
in their motivations, even when the sentences imposed are the same.
At least some judges, I would speculate, simply do not regard an
antitrust violation as a serious offense. Weak evidence for this hypothesis is that even when major figures in the corporation have
been convicted-typically, as the authors indicate, in the case of
small closely held corporations-the sentences have been mild. Further evidence appears in an article by a federal district judge explaining his decision not to impose jail sentences in a 1974 case.
Despite the seriousness of antitrust violations, I find a blanket comparison
between these crimes and other felonies inappropriate. I believe that crimes
of violence are, in general, much more destructive of the fabric of society than
are nonviolent commercial crimes. The butcher who routinely charges his customers an extra quarter for the weight of his thumb on the scale surely abuses
his position. Over time, his activities may result in an economic loss to his
4. K. ELZINGA & W. BRErr, Tim ANTITRUsT PENALTIEs: A STUDY ThLAW
43 (1976).

AND
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customers far exceeding the "take" of an average bank robbery, and, if discovered, his dishonesty would undoubtedly create mistrust and anger among his
customers. Yet, however reprehensive the butcher's conduct may be, I feel
certain that it entails a smaller social cost than would result if each of his
customers were stopped at gunpoint and robbed of a quarter several times a
week for the same period of time. Violent crime massively disrupts and distorts
the daily social intercourse among human beings upon which any viable society depends. While the two kinds of crime may have a similar economic
impact, and may both instill some apprehension in the
public, the psychologi5
cal effect of violent crime is clearly more pernicious.

Even assuming that the authors are correct, one must recognize that
this difficulty would apply to any sentence-fine includeddirected at individuals. Therefore, by their own reasoning, if
fines are to be their preferred penalty, they must intend that fines
be directed primarily, if not solely, at the corporation rather than
at individuals.
The section of chapter 3 dealing with structural relief would
work better if a clearer distinction were made between Clayton Act
(antimerger) violations and Sherman Act violations. It is hard to
imagine an effective remedy for illegally consummated mergers
other than some form of divestiture. (Of course, virtually any form
of relief, including capital punishment, in theory could be used to
deter anticompetitive mergers; the practical problems of attempting to do so are discussed below. The remarks here are directed at
remedying an anticompetitive merger that has in fact occurred.)
Section 7 of the Clayton Act is designed to prevent the emergence of an anticompetitive structure by prohibiting relatively small
aggregations of market share. As Elzinga has pointed out earlier in
an important piece of research, attempts at obtaining structural
relief for Clayton Act violations frequently have been less than completely successful. Structural relief nevertheless was clearly Elzinga's preferred solution: "[A] rule against the consummation of
anticompetitive mergers is indeed logical. For this rule to be effective, the penalty for its violation must be stringent. The rule of
quick, total structural relief needs to be followed if the incentives
to consummate anticompetitive mergers is to be minimized."' The
discussion of structural relief in the present context, however,
clearly is aimed, not at mergers, but at monopoly situations. The
reader is not well served by the inclusion of material on past efforts
in Clayton Act situations, except as it helps to illustrate the practical problems of carrying out the mechanics of divestiture, which are
5. Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590, 593 n.8
(1977).

6. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Phyrric Victories?, 12 J.L. & EcoN. 43, 76 (1969).
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equally applicable to merger and monopoly situations.
The theoretical flaw of structural relief in monopoly situations,
the authors assert, is that, if the relief is successful in eliminating
the monopoly power and hence the monopoly profits, stockholders-especially those who, buying in late, paid the capitalized value
of expected monopoly profits-are penalized. Because the courts
understand this problem, they have been reluctant to order effective
structural relief. This reluctance ultimately becomes, in the eyes of
the authors, an argument for abandoning structural relief in favor
of fines as long as the offending structure persists. Stating their
position in this way exposes its weakness. If a judge fails to impose
any relief that brings an end to monopoly profits, he is no more
likely to impose fines than he is to impose structural relief. Since
the authors' comparative evaluation of the alternative remedies is
largely deferred until a later chapter, however, further remarks on
the subject likewise will be deferred.
The brief discussion of fines in the third chapter is largely a
reporting of earlier efforts to raise the level of maximum fines that
could be imposed in Sherman Act cases, the most recent event being
the 1974 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,7 which raised the
maximum corporation fine to one million dollars (from $50,000).
The authors regard this as insufficient since the legislation merely
fixes the minimum fine and leaves the actual fine to the discretion
of the courts, which historically have been reluctant to impose even
the nominal pre-1974 maximum of $50,000.
Chapters Four and Five deal with the role of private treble
damage actions. Chapter Four consists primarily of historical and
background material, including a brief discussion of how the remedy
came to be treble damages instead of single or double damages. The
authors speculate on the mix between private and public enforcement originally contemplated by Congress and on whether the primary goal of allowing private actions was compensation or deterrence. Apparently, so little legislative debate occurred on those subjects that no strong conclusions can be drawn, and, unlike the earlier section on the penalties considered, no interesting congressional
anecdotes spice up the material. The authors do suggest that section
5(a) of the Clayton Act, passed in 1914, which allows private plaintiffs to refer to a guilty verdict in a federal trial as prima facie
evidence of liability in private suits, shows a congressional leaning
7. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706
(codified in scattered sections of 15, 47, & 49 U.S.C.).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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toward compensation rather than deterrence.
This view is unwarranted in my opinion. By making the private
plaintiff's burden easier, the provision raises the expected cost to a
would-be price fixer and should increase deterrence at the same
time that it improves the plaintiff's chances of being compensated.
In fact, the main effect of the provision is to make a defendant very
unwilling to go to trial in a federal case. Consequently, the overwhelming proportion of government price-fixing cases results in
pleas of nolo contendere, a plea that is equivalent to a guilty plea
or verdict for the purpose of sentencing but that cannot be used to
establish liability in private cases. Interestingly, in the congressional deliberation over the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act,9 the
Antitrust Division testified against a provision that would make
nolo pleas prima facie evidence in private cases on the ground that
the main victim would be the federal courts, which would have to
conduct a full trial in every price-fixing case since few defendants
would elect to plead nolo because of the treble damage exposure
that would result. 0
Most of the authors' brief discussion of the issues involved in
standing and in passing-on defenses has been rendered obsolete by
subsequent developments, although the passing-on issue has not
been resolved as of this writing." Chapter Four also includes a brief
and inconclusive section on the legal fees associated with private
actions.
Chapter Five, which also deals with private treble damage actions, is actually the first chapter in Part IH of the book, entitled
"The Analysis." The authors claim that three aspects of private
actions tend to produce inefficient results. The "perverse incentives
effect," or moral hazard, arises when firms continue to buy from an
antitrust violator even though less expensive alternatives exist, because the overcharges will be trebled when damages are awarded.
The "misinformation effect" refers to nuisance lawsuits filed without substantive merit that seek to capitalize on the risk aversion of
the defendant to induce a settlement offer. "Reparations costs" are
simply the resources used in the determination and allocation of
damages.
9. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383 (amending and enacting scattered sections of 15, 18, & 28 U.S.C.).
10. Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975: Hearings on S.1284 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Pt. 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
78 (1975).
11. The Supreme Court made recovery all but impossible for indirect purchasers in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), but Congress has shown strong inclinations
to overrule that verdict.
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Although one would expect a discussion of the possible benefits
of private actions to follow, none occurs until chapter Eight. This
makes for difficult reading and seems unnecessary. In any event, the
discussion of the evils of private enforcment is flawed in several
aspects. First, the primary examples of the perverse incentives effect come from Robinson-Patman Act cases. For reasons discussed
below, I think it unwise to generalize from one type of antitrust
violation, such as Robinson-Patman, and apply the generalizations
to other types, such as price fixing. This is a particular problem with
the Robinson-Patman Act, which economists (including Elzinga,
who has testified in favor of its amendment or repeal) have described as perverse for many years.
Second, even accepting Robinson-Patman cases as evidence,
the authors' anecdotal evidence might be describing as a perverse
incentives effect what is in fact a remediable procedural problem-specifically, the difficulty in collecting damages for price discrimination unless the plaintiff actually purchases the product from
the perpetrator at the discriminatory price. Avoiding a small percentage of the economic harm by turning to an alternative that is
only slightly better, given the discriminatory price, in most situations renders the victim ineligible to collect any damages at all since
he has made no purchases from the guilty party. In economic terms,
one can recover only the monopolist's profit rectangle, not the deadweight loss. My point is that, although this quirk may create perverse incentives, it is not an inherent flaw in private actions.
Third, although a more straightforward perverse incentives effect might exist (i.e., deliberate buying at an inflated price despite
the existence of cheaper alternatives), I am inclined not to take it
seriously because of the lack of evidence on its quantitative significance. The non-Robinson-Patman evidence involves a survey of the
utilities in the wake of the electrical equipment conspiracies of the
1950's. The survey showed that many utilities felt reasonably sure
that prices were being rigged. This perception, however, is just as
compatible with an inability of the utilities to get any hard evidence
absent grand jury power as with the perverse incentives effect. It is
also compatible with the no-care attitude among utility executives
that results simply from their regulated status in which profits
largely are unaffected by the price paid for equipment (or worse, in
which profits might be increased as higher cost capital enters the
rate base). Hence, the behavior of utilities does not make for very
convincing evidence one way or the other. Finally, since the economic misallocation resulting from monopoly pricing is that too
little of the monopolized (or price-fixed) product is purchased, does
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not the perverse incentives effect tend to reduce the misallocation
by increasing the amount of purchases?
These remarks should not be read as critical of the authors'
conclusions about the disadvantages of private actions. I merely
would put more weight upon the misinformation effect, especially
in cases alleging monopolization or attempt to monopolize, in which
the Antitrust Division-correctly in my view-has been far less aggressive than private plaintiffs.
Chapter Six deals with dissolution. The authors' concern is that
the costs of dissolution may swamp any of its benefits. The benefits
are the captured welfare triangles' 2 that might accrue from the actual remedying of monopolistic market structures. The costs are the
transaction costs involved in the mechanics of divestiture plus the
loss of any economies of scale or other efficiencies that may have
contributed to the original market structure. This long-recognized
dilemma goes beyond simply the relief issue to the question of the
basis for the alleged violation. Put succinctly, if a firm with longstanding market power has not achieved or maintained its position
by so-called "bad acts," then how else is its position to be explained
other than through economies of scale or superior efficiency? 3 Dissolution sacrifices these economic benefits and, since no anticompetitive behavior has occurred, what injunctive relief could possibly be
sought? With respect to liability, the issue is an equitable one.
Judges feel compelled to identify conduct about which they can say
"you should not have done that" before attaching liability. Taken
together, these two components raise serious questions about the
feasibility and desirability of applying dissolution to situations in
which no anticompetitive conduct has occurred.
The argument is not entirely symmetric, however, when anticompetitive behavior is found to be the key to the attainment or
maintenance of a firm's monopoly position. Here structural relief
might be defended as designed to bring about within a reasonable
time what would have occurred naturally absent the anticompeti12. Losses due to monopoly generally have been characterized as having two components: a transfer from consumers to producers as higher prices paid by consumers translate
into greater profits for the monopolist and a "deadweight loss" that results from an inefficient
allocation of resources. The latter is what the authors mean by the welfare triangle. All of
this is explained in their first chapter. Well before the publication date of the book, however,
serious debate emerged over whether the so-called "profit rectangle" also represents a fullfledged social cost as real sources would be spent by would-be monopolists in an effort to
capture these excess profits. See Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J.
POL. EcoN. 807 (1975).
13. See generally Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market
Failure Considerations, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1512 (1972).
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tive conduct. Alternatively, when structure makes the anticompetitive conduct possible (and profitable), injunctive relief aimed at
specific past practices arguably might fail to prevent the monopolist
from concocting new means to the same end.
The point of these comments is not only to reinforce the authors' notion that structural relief can in some circumstances come
up short in a benefit-cost analysis, but also to link the relief problem
more closely to the theory of the violation than they do. When no
anticompetitive conduct is found, not only is structural relief likely
to sacrifice some efficiencies, it is also somewhat unlikely that liability can be successfully achieved in the first place. On the other
hand, when "bad acts" are discovered, structural relief can be both
efficient and equitable.
The final section of the dissolution chapter sets out and critically analyzes benchmarks that have been proposed to select candidates for structural relief. They include the firm's market share, the
joint market shares of the leading firms, and the firm's profits,
absolute size, and/or price behavior. The section contains some interesting material, but the material is more appropriate for a discussion of proposed antitrust legislation (e.g., the late Senator Hart's
deconcentration bill) than for a discussion of relief under the existing antimonopoly laws when such criteria either need to be satisfied
to establish liability in the first place or are irrelevant once liability
has been established. Since the authors in their introduction claim
to accept "the general structure of present legal arrangements" and
to study "whether or not the methods and instruments of their
implementation are efficient,"' 4 this section represents a departure
from the advertised itinerary.
Chapter Seven deals with fines, the authors' preferred means
of punishing and deterring antitrust violators. The difference between fines and private damage actions, as seen by the authors, is
that, although each provides the right incentives so far as would-be
violators are concerned, the latter have the disadvantage of stimulating perverse incentives and misinformation effects. Hence, public
action via fines is similar to, but also preferred to, the private action
remedy. As indicated above, although I do not concur in the authors' entire chain of reasoning, I accept their conclusion about the
comparison.
In the next section of chapter Seven, the authors compare the
efficacy of increasing the fine for a convicted antitrust violator with
increasing the resources devoted to finding and convicting those who
14.

ELZINGA

& BRErr, supra note 4, at x.
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violate the antitrust laws. They use the concept of the would-be
violator's "expected costs" of punishment (i.e., the probability of
being caught and punished times the amount of punishment). Holding expected costs constant, they argue that a scheme involving high
fines with low probability of being caught would be a more effective
deterrent than its mirror image as long as would-be violators are risk
averse. The authors speculate that corporate managers are on balance risk averse and, moreover, more risk averse than in the good
old days of Carnegie and Firestone. They conclude that the most
desirable policy, even independent of the costs of the two alternatives, clearly is to increase fines. Moreover, the costliness of detection and conviction when compared to the costlessness (as seen by
the authors) of increasing fines further reinforces this conclusion.
(The reductio ad absurdum that infinite fines coupled with a very
small probability of being caught is the optimal solution is dealt
with by an admission that there is some level above which fines
should not go.)
The authors do consider, but reject, several obvious objections
to their results. The possibility that high fines would make judges
and juries reluctant to find parties guilty, thereby leading to an
unanticipated reduction in the probability of conviction, is given
short shrift: the pairing of increased fines with elimination of private actions would demonstrate Congress' intention so clearly that
judges and juries would go along. The possibility that the sense of
inequity might be increased if fewer convicted violators get higher
fines is dismissed with the argument that as long as anyone has the
same chance of being caught (ex ante equity), the ex post equity is
irrelevant. Although I think that many lawyers will quarrel with the
authors' handling of these possible objections, I shall decline comment except to say that a more extensive inquiry into the substance
of the possible objections, including perhaps a more thorough review
of the literature that surely must exist on the subject and some
discussions with lawyers or judges who hold different views on the
matter, would have removed some of the ivory-tower flavor their
treatment now has. If the authors did undertake such an inquiry, it
is not indicated in the text.
My own objections to the risk analysis as it affects the superiority of fines over enforcement resources (and, by the authors' extension, over incarceration) involve the identity of the object of the
penalty. The authors clearly intend the fines to fall upon the corporation, not upon the management. This follows from their earlier
objection to prison sentences based on the unwillingness of the
courts to require incarceration when the truly responsible party can-
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not be identified with precision, an objection that is stated explicitly
by the authors in the present chapter. In addition, they think that
fines on management salaries would induce the corporation to bribe
management to go ahead with an antitrust violation since the fine
would be small relative to the gains to the corporation. This problem
is developed further below.
Accepting for the moment, however, the argument that corporations display the risk preference articulated by the authors, the
actions of the corporation insofar as potential price fixing is concerned are carried out at the various levels of management of the
corporation. With the fine falling upon the corporation, the most
serious liability for the actors is the loss of job and other associated
benefits. Although these losses may be severe, the important point
is that the upper limit of the individual's liability is more or less
invariant to the level of fine imposed upon the corporation. A policy
of increasing fines and simultaneously reducing the probability of
detection and conviction thus reduces the expected loss to the individual. Hence, no matter how significant the degree of risk aversion,
the policy would be counterproductive.
As an aside, I am even prepared to question the role of risk
aversion in determining the corporation's preference for high fines
and low probability of detection or vice versa. It seems to me that
the damage caused a corporation by conviction of an antitrust violation might be far greater than the fine if the corporation's public
image is at all important in affecting consumer attitudes and, ultimately, consumer demand for the company's product. This public
image factor, which would be triggered only by actual detection and
conviction and which would be largely independent of the amount
of fine, may render attractive from the corporation's viewpoint (as
well as the individual manager's) a policy of increased fines and
reduced enforcement resources.
From my perspective, therefore, efficiency requires that the
individual actor, such as management, ought to stand some risk of
public sanction, either a fine or incarceration, in addition to the
private sanction of loss of job and job-related benefits.'" This is not
to say that corporations ought to go unpunished. For one thing, the
offending managers are not likely to appropriate all the excess profits from their illegal behavior-the stockholders get most of it.
These profits, therefore, are recovered by inflicting financial punish15. I might add that there is also an equitable question whether stockholders should
suffer from the overly aggressive behavior of one of its employees.
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ment upon the corporation. 6 Moreover, as the authors indicate, the
corporations have some, albeit not perfect, control over the atmosphere in which an individual's decision to violate the antitrust laws
takes place. They can take some low-cost but effective measures to
discourage violations and may do so if they stand to bear some of
the costs of being caught. Clearly, however, the free-rider problem
is too severe to allow individuals to escape public sanction. Assuming, therefore, that efficiency requires that individuals as well as
corporations be penalized publicly for antitrust violations, the question becomes whether the authors' risk analysis can be used to support the policy recommendation of shifting the balance between
fines and enforcement resources. The answer, I think, is suggested
by the authors' earlier comments. Specifically, if there is an upper
limit to the maximum fine that reasonably can be extracted from
individual wrongdoers and beyond which individual bankruptcy
occurs, then increasing the nominal fine beyond that level while
simultaneously reducing the enforcement level reduces the expected
cost to the individual and encourages rather than discourages criminal activity. It is not certain that the current level of fines is close
to the ceiling of what can practicably be collected, although I suspect that for most individuals it is. Two additional factors should
be mentioned. Increasing corporate fines, while not increasing the
individual's expected cost, may induce the corporation to increase
its internal efforts to discourage violations. On the other hand,
higher fines induce the corporation, if a violation has occurred, to
increase the resources spent in concealment or, if indicted, in defending itself. Thus there possibly is still room to implement the
authors' policy recommendations. Clearly, however, there are limits. ,7
The same is true for the use of fines in lieu of incarceration.
Although fines may be a rather "costless" method of punishment
and deterrence when compared to incarceration, the upper limit of
what reasonably can be collected may be too low to deter some
individuals from committing a crime that might substantially benefit their careers. When this is so, the only available method of increasing deterrence may be incarceration. It might also be the case
that a major burden of a substantial fine may fall not upon the
individual, but upon his family. Although incarceration may not be
entirely painless for those left behind, this factor may increase the
16.
17.
1977).

I am grateful to James Broadus and Gerald Childs for this point.
For a similar treatment, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 234-37 (2d ed.
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attractiveness of incarceration. Many other factors are said by others to weigh in favor of incarceration, but these are discussed adequately elsewhere.' Included is the notion that, whatever the factual reduction in the antitrust violator's utility as a result of a
substantial fine, an undesirable and presumably unalterable public
perception may ensue that white-collar criminals are treated more
favorably than so-called "ordinary" criminals.
In the last part of chapter Seven the authors discuss the level
of fines that would be directed against the corporation. After considering sales and assets as possible criteria, the authors settle on
twenty-five percent of the firm's pretax profits for every year of
anticompetitive activity. Particularly surprising is that the profits
to be used as the base are not the profits resulting from the conspiracy nor (what may be the same thing) the profits in the line of
business affected by the conspiracy. Rather the authors use the
profits for the entire corporation!Part of the reason for this remarkable conclusion is the difficulty of determining profits specifically
attributable to a single line of business because of the arbitrariness
in standard accounting practice. The solution chosen by the authors, however, is not necessarily the next best alternative. The
Antitrust Division, facing a somewhat similar problem,'" elected to
recommend a fine of ten percent of the corporation's sales in the
affected line of commerce during the conspiracy with adjustments
2
for mitigating or exacerbating circumstances. 1
Chapter Eight discusses probable objections to the authors'
proposal for eliminating private antitrust actions. Reflecting some
confidence in the ability of the private sector to find and prosecute
violations in an efficient manner, most of the objections involve
doubts about the ability or energy of the federal agencies, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission, to do so. The
authors, who criticized the perverse incentives and misinformation
effect of private actions in earlier chapters, display considerable
confidence in the federal agencies.
An enforcement agency can commit two types of errors. The
first, a Type I error in statistical jargon, is to fail to prosecute true
violations, either through incompetence or malevolence. On the first
score, although many cut-and-dried violations-largely price fix18. See Renfrew, supra note 5.
19. Except that the situation included corporate fines in addition to prison sentences
for individuals.
20. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Memorandum on Guidelines for Sentencing Recommendations in Felony Cases Under the Sherman Act (Feb. 24,
1977), excerpted in 45 U.S.L.W. 2419 (Mar. 8, 1977).
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ing-no doubt do go undetected, the record of private plaintiffs in
leading the way in these situations does not raise great fears in my
mind that many more valid cases will fail to see the light of day in
a world without private action. Indeed, as the authors indicate, the
incentive for knowledgeable private parties to provide "hot tips" in
such a world is undiminished and perhaps increased. A Type II error
occurs when a case is brought and perhaps even won even though
no anticompetitive conduct has, in fact, occurred. Although for
most economists the federal record is hardly unblemished in this
respect, the record of private actions is a disaster. Moreover, I suspect that this judgment would be supported by at least some of
those who believe that economists' views on what is anticompetitive
are not determinative or perhaps not even relevant.
The only objection considered (and rejected) by the authors
that strikes me as having some merit involves the equity of denying
the injured parties" the ability to receive compensation. Many
thoughtful persons, of course, have considered the question in the
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois,21 which can be characterized crudely as having scuttled
equity in favor of efficiency. There is hardly unanimity on the issue,
favored to win out through
although at this writing equity appears
22
congressional reversal of the decision.
In a brief final chapter Elzinga and Breit report the "bottom
line":
The discussion of the instruments of antitrust policy in part II leads ineluctably to a rather sweeping recommendation for the streamlining of the antitrust
tool kit. A severe monetary exaction paid to the state by violators [read 23corporate violators] should be the sole instrument of antitrust enforcement.

In the opinion of the authors there is some fine that would be as
effective as any other instrument of deterrence, and a fine consumes
no scarce resources once detection and conviction have occurred. In
addition, the inefficiencies of private enforcement are avoided.
Moreover, the authors would use the fine to obtain any antitrust results that are desired. For example, they recommend that
advocates of deconcentration simply impose fines until a firm's
market share reached the desired level. Companies that have engaged in anticompetitive mergers would be subject to fines until the
21. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
22. See, e.g., ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), Aug. 28, 1977, at A-10 to -13; id.,
Oct. 27, 1977, at A-1 to -4; id. Nov. 11, 1977, at A-5 to -8. See also id. Sept. 15, 1977, A-6 to 10; id. Sept. 22, 1977, A-4 to -7. To be fair, part of the sentiment in favor of legislative reversal
involves doubts about the willingness of direct purchasers to prosecute vigorously.
23. ELZINGA & BREIT, supra note 4, at 150.
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merger was undone. Fines could be levied to induce oligopolists to
avoid tacit collusion. Finally, even practices such as tying contracts
would be subject to the financial bite.
Many of the objections to this sweeping recommendation are
discussed above. Rather than reiterate all my criticisms, I shall
instead set out what I regard as the crucial analytical steps that one
might take in developing de novo an ideal policy for antitrust penalties.
1. Distinguishing between deterrence and punishment. The
first step is to make clear the distinction between deterrence and
punishment. Any penalty is costless as long as it is never imposed.
In theory, then, perfect deterrence could be efficiently attained by
any sanction-fine, incarceration, torture-as long as the level of
the sanction is set sufficiently high. Perfect deterrence is not desired, however, even though it could be achieved "costlessly" in the
sense that Elzinga and Breit use the term. The reason is that the
"crime" for which the sanction might be imposed is sufficiently
vague at the margin, as I shall explain below, that a sanction high
enough to deter all "crime" would deter a substantial amount of
neutral and even procompetitive behavior as decision makers seek
to reduce to zero the possibility of being (even wrongfully) convicted. Thus the optimal level of deterrence is a more complicated
24
problem than the authors indicate.
2. Isolating situations in which sanctions could actually be
imposed. Given, for the reasons just discussed, that the optimal
level of deterrence is not that of zero crime, the efficiency calculation regarding the choice of a sanction clearly involves the costs of
imposing the sanction only in those instances when detection and
conviction occur.
3. Isolating activity for which sanctions are inappropriate.In
the case of some activities covered by the antitrust laws, the anticompetitive status of that activity is determined ad hoc; the activity
is not clearly ruled out by the wording of the statute or by the body
of judicial opinion existing on the date at which it occurs. The vast
bulk of activities potentially covered by the antitrust
laws-mergers, monopolization, vertical restraints, tying contracts,
and restrictive patent licenses-for the most part are public events,
such that the probability that they will be reported or can be discovered is quite close to one. Hence, such activities occur in the first
24.

At least nothing in their introductory discussion suggestions that their concept of

the costs of enforcement includes this kind of Type II error, although it certainly is not
inconsistent with their analytical framework.
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place only when the decision makers, probably on the advice of
experienced antitrust counsel, think that there is at least reasonable
doubt whether the proposed activity is covered by the antitrust
laws. Thus for such activities, by the very definition of the process,
almost every case is borderline; the answer to the question of what
is and what is not anticompetitive behavior is constantly being redefined as new merger situations, new forms of behavior, or old behavior in new circumstances come to the attention of the prosecuting
agency whose views of the degree of anticompetitive effect are
bound to differ in at least some instances from those who give the
private antitrust advice that permitted the activity in the first
place. This is one reason why the Antitrust Division should not be
expected to win a vast majority of its cases.
Clearly, punitive sanctions are inappropriate in such instances.
Although the agency likely would prefer that corporations not walk
precisely on the edge of the law, no good effect is served by making
firms in their caution stay so clearly inside the line that many efficient actions are avoided. I suspect that the court costs alone are
probably sufficient to induce the correct level of caution.
The only aim of the prosecuting agency is to obtain relief
against the firm in question and, implicitly, to define the limits of
the law regarding the activity in question for other firms that might
contemplate such action in the future. For most forms of restrictive
contracts or behavior, simple injunctive relief will suffice; for most
mergers and some monopolization, some form of structural relief
may be required to permit the return to the competitive situation
that would have prevailed but for the offending conduct.
The third analytical step, therefore, sorts out those categories
of antitrust violations in which sanctions other than mere court
costs are required to promote effective deterrence. Because they are
public in nature, most antitrust-related anticompetitive activities
are deterred simply because the probability of detection is quite
high and because court costs or divestiture costs, if detected, are not
trivial. For most of the remaining activity, deterrence is not desirable because it cannot be achieved without simultaneously deterring
perfectly legitimate activity.
4. Identifying activity for which sanctions are appropriate.
There is nonetheless a class of cases for which sanctions are required
on the one hand because the activities are clearly anticompetitive
and, on the other hand, because they are sufficiently covert that
detection is not automatic. Price fixing is the most obvious of these
activities (other than the kind of price fixing, such as fixed commission rates on the stock exchanges, that has been carried on publicly
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for years in the belief that it was legal), although certain kinds of
predatory activities in a monopolization context might qualify in
some circumstances. The analysis in the Elzinga-Breit book is relevant to these types of cases and to these alone.
5. Determining the appropriateparty to receive the sanction.
For that category of activities in which sanctions are appropriate, a
distinction first must be made between the individual actor and the
corporation on whose behalf he presumably acts. Should both be
subject to sanction or only one, and if only one, which one? Questions of equity toward stockholders are relevant-on the one hand,
they are not directly responsible for the crime, but on the other, they
likely receive most of the benefits to the extent that the crime was
at all successful in attaining profits greater than those that otherwise would have been earned. In addition to questions of equity,
questions of efficiency are important. Is the corporation able to
monitor and suppress anticompetitive activity at a relatively low
cost? What are the motives of the individual manager when only the
corporation is to be responsible? For reasons discussed above, I
think that sanctions probably need to be imposed on both parties.
6. Determining the appropriatekind of sanction. Once a clear
distinction is made regarding the party to receive the sanction, intelligent discussion can ensue about the appropriate type of sanction. For obvious reasons, incarceration is inappropriate for corporations, although some have argued that higher officials who did not
participate in the activity but had knowledge of it should be criminally liable. 5
With respect to individuals, one clearly must choose between
fines and incarceration. This choice would have to be based on the
relative cost of the two sanctions, the ability of the individual to pay
a financial penalty high enough to achieve the optimal level of deterrence, and possibly, considerations of equity vis-d-vis other types
of crime (or other types of criminals). Before making this choice, I
would want to talk with judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers to
gain some insight into the noneconomic aspects of the problem.
7. Balancing the severity of the sanction against the costs of
detection and conviction. The kind of penalty having been decided,
one still must consider the trade-off between the level of the penalty
and the amount of resources devoted to detection and conviction.
Both contribute to the individual's-and the corporation'sexpected cost of crime, but each has its own administrative costs
25.

ELZINGA & BREIT,

supra note 4, at 40-42.
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and conceivably its own impact upon the degree of risk perceived
by the would-be criminal. Again, practical limitations on the
amount of any penalty that can be extracted may contribute to the
advantage of detection resources on the margin.
Having set up this analytical framework for the problem of
antitrust penalties, I am not prepared in this essay to solve it. For
me, the problem is particularly complex and not amenable to the
authors' rather simple and sweeping conclusion to rely entirely upon
a fine directed at corporations. Hence, I give the book a poor mark
for its success in coming to grips with the problem. As a seminal
work, however, I can recommend it. It is exceptionally well written
and easy to read and raises many interesting questions. Although
the volume might not deserve the legendary place on everyone's
bookshelf, most will benefit by borrowing it from the library for a
day or so.

By Richard A. Posner.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. Pp. x, 262. $15.00.

ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE.

Reviewed by H. Michael Mann* and Teresa Amott**
Professor Posner offers an articulation of a viewpoint derived
from research and writing in the law and economics of antitrust. His
position is that the promotion of vigorous competition can be accomplished by one statute (section 1 of the Sherman Act) that prohibits collusive action designed to restrict output below and concurrently raise prices above the competitive level and that imposes
severe fines for violations. We are unconvinced, although we acknowledge that we agree with much of Posner's criticism about the
application of antitrust law.
The case law on mergers, vertical restrictions, and various exclusionary practices all too frequently is confused and contradictory. Economists cannot escape some responsibility for this state of
affairs, for as one of our distinguished colleagues has stated:
[If an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort or another-that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And
as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of ununderstandable practices
tends to be very large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation frequent.'
* Professor of Economics, Boston College. B.A., Haverford College, 1956; Ph.D., Cornell
University, 1962.
**B.A., Smith College, 1972; candidate for Ph.D. (Economics), Boston College.
1.

Coase, Industrial Organization:A Proposal for Research, in POLICY ISSUES AND RE-
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Absent certain market characteristics that might result in anticompetitive potency, many business practices subject to antitrust
litigation are innocent of undesirable impact on the competitive
process. The necessary characteristic for Posner is oligopoly, a condition in which the market contains only a few sellers. He stresses
explicitly and implicitly 2 the presence of oligopoly as the sine qua
non for any serious antitrust inquiry into the likelihood of anticompetitive behavior and its associated consequences on price and output.
An important additional condition, however, is whether the
oligopoly is associated with significant entry barriers. Posner's failure to analyze the latter undermines the credibility of his argument
regarding liability and remedy.'
I.

BARRIERS TO ENTRY

That persistent departures from a competitive price level require collusion, explicit or tacit, among sellers within the market
and protection from potential entrants is a well-established proposition of economic theory. Empirical evidence indicates that the combination of oligopoly and high entry barriers produces supracompetitive prices and profitability, an indication of monopolistic output
restriction.4 The trouble from the standpoint of Posner's credibility
is that he does not believe in barriers to entry. Without entry bar67 (V. Fuchs ed. 1972).
2. Posner states, "It seems doubtful, therefore, whether vertical mergers should be
forbidden save in the unusual case where actually made with an exclusionary or otherwise
improper (e.g., to shore up a cartel) intent." R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 200 (1976). An effective cartel or a strong probability of successful exclusion
depends, in Posner's view, upon cooperation among firms, the necessary condition for which
is oligopoly. Id. at 52, 54-56.
3. Unfortunately, despite Posner's belief in the importance of economics as a vehicle
for constructing a rational antitrust policy, he makes numerous theoretical mistakes. His
description of the "second best" theory (id. at 13-14) is wrong. Second best is concerned with
resource allocation in the production of alternative products, not with the respective levels
of marginal cost. As long as product prices depart from their marginal costs by the same factor
of proportionality, regardless of the levels of marginal costs, resources are appropriately
allocated.
Posner's handling of short-run equilibrium in a competitive market (id. at 136-37) and
of the relationship between short-run and long-run marginal cost curves (id. at 191-93) is also
incorrect. This was pointed out in F.M. Scherer's review of Posner's book in 86 YALE L.J. 974,
979-80, 991 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Scherer Review]. There is another instance in which
more careful editing would have helped to avoid error. To say that transportation costs are
not important in the beer industry is a factual error. POSNER, supranote 2, at 130; see Scherer,
Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration,in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW
LEARNING 30 (table 4) (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann, J. Weston eds. 1974).
4. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 231-34
(1970).
SEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
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riers, however, no serious, long-run departures from the competitive
price and output can occur even with an oligopolistic market. If a
few sellers set prices higher than the competitive level, entry will
occur, thus expanding output and attaining the competitive result.5
Posner adopts George Stigler's definition of a barrier to entry
as "a condition that imposes higher long-run costs of production on
a new entrant than are borne by the firms already in the market."
He concludes that "barriers to entry in this sense appear to be
rare," the only case deserving recognition being close control of an
7
essential factor of production.
If barriers to entry are rare, how can monopolistic pricing ever
be more than a short-run phenomenon, correctable by market forces
without the necessity for any antitrust laWs? Why, for instance, set
any standard concerning concentration ratios for horizontal mergers 8 if no barriers to entry are present? The answer must be that
cooperating oligopolists might engage in exclusionary practices that
block entry. The author suggests, however, that "the number and
severity of the exclusionary practices have been greatly exaggerated."9 In Posner's view, only predatory pricing, vertical restrictions, exclusive dealing, and boycotts give rise to antitrust concern
and then only under special circumstances (e.g., the presence of
oligopoly plus a clearly anticompetitive motive).10 There is appar5. At one point Posner states, "At prices substantially above cost-the sorts of prices
with which the antitrust laws are properly concerned-the number of potential competitors
will normally be very large." POSNER, supra note 2, at 117. If so, then such prices can only
obtain in the short run since all those potential entrants will enter, expand supply, and reduce
price to cost. Therefore, there seems to be little reason for antitrust concern since the market
will correct any tendency for price to depart from cost. One wonders why Posner does not
call for an abolition of the antitrust laws.
6. Id. at 59.
7. It is difficult to be sure what Posner is claiming about barriers to entry. He asserts
confidently, "Economies of scale do not create a barrier to entry. . . ." Id. at 92. Because
the presence of economies of scale in distribution increases the scale necessary for entry,
however, it can make exclusive dealing contracts anticompetitive, i.e., enhance "the opportunity for monopoly pricing." Id. at 202. That is the point! Barriers provide such an opportunity for persistent monopolistic pricing.
8. Id. at 112.
9. Id. at 171.
10. Posner's analysis of Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 367 F.
Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802
(1975), and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), both of which involved charges of single firm anticompetitive behavior, leaves him skeptical that any exclusionary conduct occurred. His skepticism
may reflect the view that "[t]he only truly unilateral acts by which firms can get or keep
monopoly power are practices like committing fraud on the Patent Office or blowing up a
competitor's plant. . .. " Id. at 212. It is nowhere made clear why a dominant firm cannot,
even in Posner's limited circumstances, do what he concedes an oligopoly might do to exclude.
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ently little for antitrust to do.
This circumscribed role for antitrust rests upon the view that
barriers to entry are unimportant except in the rare instances in
which one of the above-mentioned practices might exclude potential
entrants or are legitimate (e.g., legal patents). Why is it, then, that
the phenomenon of oligopolists earning rates of return persistently
above the opportunity cost of capital occurs in certain kinds of
consumer goods industries, those characterized by substantial advertising outlays?" It is because entry can be made difficult by
intense advertising. In addition, the number of entry-inhibiting
strategies, few of which have been the subject of antitrust purview,
are not limited to ones that promote product differentiation. 2 The
range of behavioral choices that act upon and interact with the
market environment to erect entry barriers are myriad, and our
3
understanding of the mechanisms is far from complete.'
If the social costs of monopolistic pricing are of an order that
Posner alleges, then it is time for antitrust authorities to address
dominance by the few when entry appears to be difficult. The task
will not be easy, particularly because it requires an ability to separate those strategies that contrive protection against entry from
those that are a genuine outcome of the struggle to provide consumers with superior products and services. 4 Even when separation is
possible and a reasonable determination is made that entry barriers
A counterview that IBM and United Shoe are plausible examples of the use of exclusionary
conduct is provided in Scherer Review, supra note 3, at 992-93.
11. See M. PORTER, INTERBRAND CHOICE, STRATEGY, AND BILATERAL MARKET PowER
(1976). Some claim that this occurrence reflects an accounting bias, the treatment of advertising expenditures as a current expense rather than as an investment outlay. The case for and
evidence in behalf of this view are not persuasive. W. Comanor & T. Wilson, Advertising,
Consumer Behavior, and Market Imperfections: A Review 24-32 (Department of Economics,
University of California, Santa Barbara, Sept. 21, 1977, Working Paper No. 88) (on file with
the Vanderbilt Law Review).
12. For example, see Caves & Porter, From Entry Barriersto Mobility Barriers:Conjectural Decisions and Contrived Deterrence to New Competition, 91 Q.J. ECON. 241 (1977);
Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barrierto Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 Q.J.
EcoN. 85 (1968).

13. Posner believes that Procter & Gamble's (P&G) merger with Clorox could not be
anticompetitive because entry is so easy into the liquid bleach market. POSNER, supra note
2, at 119. He might wonder, then, why P&G was willing to pay $30,300,000 for assets having
a book value of $12,600,000. P&G was capitalizing something. It is plausible that it was a
projected future stream of monopoly returns, given Clorox's commanding market share and
its ability to maintain a substantial price premium with respect to private label alternatives.
Unfortunately, and here we agree with Posner, too little economic analysis typically is undertaken in antitrust matters to identify the sources of monopoly power.
14. The litigation currently in trial involving the Federal Trade Commission and the
four leading ready-to-eat cereal makers joins this issue.
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were contrived, the difficult matter of remedies remains, a subject
to which we now turn.
II.

REMEDIES

Posner believes that the punishing of cooperative behavior,
tacit or explicit, with severe fines will be sufficient to maintain
competitive vigor in the economy. We doubt it. Oligopolists have an
incentive to coordinate their price behavior, and experience has
taught that the cessation of an explicit agreement does not prevent
the recurrence of the coordination of prices. 5 Substantial fines
might prevent corporate recidivism in the use of explicit agreements, but the incentive to use tacit arrangements would be that
much stronger.
Posner would deal with the problem by prosecuting tacit arrangements. This would be accomplished by an inference of coordinated pricing whenever certain structural features (e.g., high seller
concentration, many buyers, inelasticity of demand, slow entry,
standardized product, and static demand) combine with market
characteristics such as a stable pattern of market shares, persistent
price discrimination, exchanges of information about prices, the
nature of changes in price, price variations among regions not explainable by cost differences, and identical bids.
The problem with Posner's approach is that facts upon which
he would rely are often difficult to interpret and may even point in
opposite directions regarding the presence of collusion. He cites
such an instance in his discussion of United States v. Container
8 What, then, are
Corp. of America."
the weights to be placed upon
the facts so that the correct inference can be made? Unfortunately,
economists' powers of analysis and observation are not so sure that
we can presume that we would know whether collusion was present.
Posner recognizes this when he states that his necessary condition,
oligopoly or high seller concentration, is linked with collusion in
complicated and poorly understood ways. 7 This means that eco15. The Antitrust Division found in 1976, fifteen years after the famous electrical equipment price-fixing conspiracies, that "identical pricing policies adopted and made public by
the companies [GE and Westinghouse] beginning in 1963 had the effect of eliminating price
competition in the turbine generator industry." U.S. Won't File Suit Naming GE,
Westinghouse, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1976, at 2, col. 2. See also Nicholls, The Tobacco Case of
1946, in READINGS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 105 (R. Heflebower & G.
Stocking eds. 1958). Posner recognizes the tendency for recidivism among firms found in
violation of the antitrust laws, the offense being "usually price fixing." Posner, A Statistical
Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 395 (1970).
16. 393 U.S. 333 (1969). Posner's discussion begins at page 143.
17. POSNER, supra note 2, at 96.
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nomic analysis cannot easily uncover tacit collusion among oligopolists, a realty that strengthens the likelihood of implicit understandings. It is simply naive to believe that even substantial fines
will "force a group of oligopolists to behave as if they were not
aware of their individual influence on each other's policies."'
Even if the facts of a particular case permitted a finding of
collusion, the actual fines levied are not likely to be substantial. As
Posner points out in earlier research, judges on the average have
been unwilling to impose fines anywhere near the maximum called
for in Sherman Act violations.19 Posner proposes that the fines be
based upon monetary estimates of social damage divided by the
probability of apprehension and conviction, the effect of which
would be more severe than at present. Since it is dubious that,
except in rare circumstances, either the social damage or the probability of punishment could be estimated with any precision, there
is every reason to expect judges to be conservative, minimizing the
social cost of the violation and maximizing the probability of punishment so that, as now, fines would turn out to be modest.
If antitrust policy is to reduce the incidence of monopoly power
in our economy, remedies beyond an assessment of fines must be
part of the arsenal. For example, when a well-established brand
image confers the power to set supracompetitive prices across a
large number of local markets and to eliminate entry by selectively
cutting price in some of the markets in which entry has begun-a
price cut that is not predatory by any accepted definition-then the
monopoly power, rather than the price behavior arising from it,
should be dealt with directly. This is exactly the conclusion of the
administrative law judge in the initial decision involving the ReaLemon division of the Borden Company. 20 He recommended the licensing of the trademark "ReaLemon," the source of Borden's monopoly
power, to interested entrants.2 1 A fine in this type of situation, if
sufficiently stiff, presumably would deter price cutting in the face
of entry, hardly an outcome that Posner or we, for that matter,
would find desirable.
III.

CONCLUSION

If barriers to entry are as important as they must be for some
firms and groups of firms persistently to earn rates of return above
18. W. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW 310 (1949).
19. Posner, supra note 15, at 388-95.
20. Borden, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,194 (1976).
21. Id. at 21,107.
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the opportunity cost of capital, then antitrust has a major responsibility. It is, despite our incomplete and imperfect understanding of
market processes, to make the effort to identify those strategies that
contrive entry barriers and to stop them effectively by uncovering
and curtailing the circumstances from which they derive potency.
This is no easy undertaking, but one that promises a more competitive economy in the future than one that limits its objective to
ferreting out cooperative price behavior and imposing a fine.

TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY.

By Ronald Dworkin. Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 1977. Pp. xv, 293. $12.00.
Reviewed by John D. Hodson*
The work of Ronald Dworkin covers a broad range of topics in
political and legal philosophy. His Taking Rights Seriously brings
together essays on such matters as the nature of law and judicial
decision, constitutional theory, justice, civil disobedience, reverse
discrimination, and the enforcement of morality. His positions on
these issues are closely reasoned, challenging, and often highly plausible. Unifying and underlying these positions is a notion of legal
and moral rights. For Dworkin moral rights are fundamental and
provide the basis for his views on the normative issues addressed.
Moral rights also have an important place in Dworkin's theory of the
nature of law and judicial decision, for they, in combination with
facts about the particular institution of law in question, form the
basis of the judge's interpretation of legal rights.
In this review, I shall focus primarily upon Dworkin's theory of
moral rights, both because of the way in which the theory affects
every aspect of his thinking and because the theory receives more
new development in Taking Rights Seriously than any other of his
ideas. Although Dworkin's theory of moral rights covers a broad
range of issues, it can best be tested by reference to its consequences
for some relatively restricted problems. I shall give special attention
to Dworkin's discussion of the enforcement of morality, because it
reveals critical features of his theory of moral rights. I shall consider
first some issues useful in determining the exact nature of the theories that oppose the enforcement of morality and then turn to Dworkin's reasons for opposing the enforcement of morality and to the
* Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas.
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theory of rights upon which these reasons are based.
Dworkin discusses the problem of the enforcement of morality
most extensively in his critique of Patrick Devlin. In his chapter
entitled "Liberty and Moralism," Dworkin criticizes Devlin's The
Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). He
attributes to Devlin two arguments for the enforcement of morality.
Dworkin rejects the first, based upon both the idea that a society
has the right to protect itself and the claim that a society cannot
exist without prohibiting at least some behavior it considers immoral, on the ground that it involves an unjustified shift between
classifying immorality as a necessary condition to justified prohibition and classifying it as a sufficient condition. The second of
Devlin's arguments is based upon the idea that a society has the
right to follow its own lights, that is, "to protect its central and
valued social institutions against conduct which the vast bulk of its
members disapproves on moral principle."' Dworkin's objection to
this argument is that Devlin fails to make a distinction crucial to
the argument's validity, namely, the distinction between the
"anthropological" sense and the "discriminatory" sense of what
constitutes a moral position.2 In the anthropological sense, whatever
attitudes a group displays about the rightness or wrongness of various forms of behavior constitute a moral position, while in the
discriminatory sense only attitudes based upon reasons-not upon
prejudices, matters of personal taste, arbitrary stands, and so
on-may constitute a moral position. Dworkin's point is that, although Devlin's claim that society has the right to prohibit behavior
of which it disapproves on the basis of a discriminatory moral position is plausible, the claim that society has such a right on the basis
of an anthropological moral position is not. Because Devlin's position involves reliance on the latter kind of moral position, Dworkin
finds it objectionable.
In thus attacking Devlin, Dworkin defends a version of what
may be called the limits thesis, according to which the law is significantly limited in what it justifiably may prohibit or regulate. The
classical limits thesis is expressed in Mill's On Liberty, but the idea
of a limits thesis is not restricted to the specific dimensions of his
position, as is shown by the way in which Dworkin's attack on
Devlin imposes a limit on the methods that may be used to decide
what to prohibit, but not on the kinds of conduct that may be
prohibited. Devlin, on the other hand, rejects the very idea of a
1. R.
2.

DwomIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

Id. at 248.

247 (1977).
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limits thesis, claiming that "it is not possible to set theoretical
limits" to the law.' Thus Dworkin can be interpreted as a defender
of a limits thesis, and his criticism of Devlin can be viewed as a
defense of the limits thesis against Devlin's attack.
The exact role of a limits thesis is not made clear by either
Devlin or Dworkin. A limits thesis might be advocated or attacked
from two importantly different perspectives. One is the voterlegislator perspective of one who must decide what policies and laws
should be enacted and on the basis of that decision contribute to the
enactment of the chosen legislation. From this perspective, the limits thesis provides guidance to the voter-legislator by asserting that
certain kinds of laws are unjustifiable and should not be enacted.
The voter-legislator who follows a limits thesis thus will vote against
the enactment of laws violating the demands of the limits thesis.
The group-decision perspective is suggested by appeals to such
things as the "rights of the majority" or the "rights of society" to
enact such laws as the group sees fit. From this perspective, the
question is that of determining the best way of reaching group
decisions, given that each member of the group has reached his or
her own decision as an individual. The problem from this perspective is not what the content of the law should be; rather, it is how
the content should be determined, given the existence of disagreements. From this perspective, a limits thesis apparently dictates
that the group decision be reached by methods that guarantee that
certain kinds of laws will not be enacted. A limits thesis thus can
be interpreted as either a guide to the voter-legislator or a theory of
group decisionmaking.
Neither Devlin nor Dworkin gives this distinction the recognition it deserves. Devlin's claim that acceptance of-democracy requires rejection of the idea of a limits thesis is plausible only from
the group-decision perspective. If we accept democracy in some
form as our group-decision procedure, then indeed we have no guarantee that the content of the law will not violate the restrictions of
a limits thesis. Acceptance of democracy as a group-decision procedure, however, in no way requires that each individual voterlegislator decide what to vote for on the basis of what the group
prefers. Thus, if a limits thesis is intended to address the voterlegislator perspective, any commitment to democracy as a groupdecision procedure is fundamentally irrelevant to the correctness of
the limits thesis. The limits thesis provides the voter-legislator a
3.

P. DEVLmN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 12 (1965).
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guide to the kinds of laws that should and should not be enacted. If
it fails to persuade, and laws that violate the limits thesis are enacted, the defender of the limits thesis is not committed to the view
that the group decision should have been made in some other way.
He is only committed to the view that a law was enacted that should
not have been. Devlin's failure to attend to these different perspectives allows him to attack limits theses on irrelevant grounds.
In his attack on Devlin's claim that a society has the right to
prohibit that which it disapproves on moral principle, Dworkin also
fails to distinguish between the voter-legislator perspective and the
group-decision perspective. He denies that Devlin's argument is
plausible when the moral position involved is merely an anthropological one. When one distinguishes the two perspectives, however,
the soundness of Dworkin's criticism is much less clear. If Devlin is
taken as addressing the group-decision problem, adherence to
Dworkin's restrictions on moral positions seems to deny that democracy is the best solution to that problem. The votes of individuals
would count only if based upon a discriminatory moral position, and
the decision of when that requirement is satisfied could not be determined democratically without abandoning the essence of the requirement itself. Ultimate power would lie in hands other than
those of the people exercising their own possibly nondiscriminatory
judgment. In other words, Devlin may well be right if his claim is
that commitment to democracy as a group-decision procedure
means allowing individuals to exercise their own judgment even if
it is nondiscriminatory. Thus Dworkin's restrictions look too strong
when applied to the group-decision perspective.
Is Dworkin, however, committed to democracy as a groupdecision procedure? He does subject majority rule to attack in his
chapter entitled "Constitutional Cases." In that chapter Dworkin
claims, in part, that American democracy is based upon constitutionalism, "the theory that the majority must be restrained to protect individual rights." 4 Dworkin makes this claim in the context of
a defense of judicial activism, the making of controversial decisions
by the courts rather than by other allegedly more democratic institutions. Even if Dworkin is right on this point, however, the argument does not show that we do or should abandon democracy as the
best group-decision procedure at the ultimate level. In fact, of
course, the Constitution allows the people to overrule the courts
through changes in the Constitution, so although the courts may
4.

DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 142.
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restrain a simple majority, a larger majority still retains ultimate
authority. Furthermore, Devlin's position, when viewed as addressing the group-decision problem, still seems quite plausible despite
his failure to require that voters act on the basis of a discriminatory
moral position. Even if a simple majority may properly be restrained, to deny that even a larger majority should prevail in the
making of group decisions does seem to abandon an essential element of democracy. Dworkin's restrictions, taken as a solution to
the group-decision problem, still seem too restrictive of democracy.
When these matters are examined from the voter-legislator
perspective, Dworkin's view still seems unacceptable except that in
this instance, rather than being too restrictive, it is not restrictive
enough. Applied to the voter-legislator problem, Dworkin's position,
as implied by his critique of Devlin, is that the voter-legislator
should vote only on the basis of a discriminatory moral position and
not on the basis of a merely anthropological one. The rejection of
the merely anthropological moral position is strongly plausible, for
there is surely no reason to think that a merely anthropological
moral position is likely to provide sound guidance to the voterlegislator. Any view that a voter-legislator takes as providing guidance should include at least the restrictions of Dworkin's discriminatory morality. There is no reason, however, to stop with merely
those restrictions. Ideally, a voter-legislator should be guided by the
most defensible moral position available rather than by just any
position that satisfies the requirements of discriminatory morality.
To allow the voter-legislator to use anything less than the best available moral position would be to abandon the point of having guidance for the voter-legislator. To set the goal any lower would be to
fail to expect the voter-legislator to avoid supporting morally unsound legislation. Thus the voter-legislator should look for guidance
to a theory that meets standards higher than those of Dworkin's
discriminatory morality. The most defensible moral position should
be sought. The standards of discriminatory morality are not restrictive enough.
As they apply to the group-decision perspective, then, Devlin's
arguments retain considerable plausibility even in the face of Dworkin's criticism. Viewed from the voter-legislator perspective, however, both Devlin and Dworkin fail to provide fully satisfactory positions. Devlin's claims about the requirements of democracy have
little relevance to the problem faced by the voter-legislator, while
Dworkin's restrictions on moral positions do not set a sufficiently
high standard. This means that, although Devlin fails to demonstrate that the idea of a limits thesis directed at the voter-legislator
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is unsound, neither does Dworkin demonstrate in his critique of
Devlin that such a thesis is sound. From this examination of Dworkin's discussion of Devlin one can conclude that a limits thesis
should be directed at the problem faced by the voter-legislator and
that it should identify certain kinds of legislation that should not
be supported but opposed. Furthermore, a limits thesis should provide insight into the moral theory upon which it is based and clarify
how the moral theory limits the proper uses of law. With this, the
voter-legislator would be in a position not only to vote correctly, but
also to explain why his or her vote is correct.
The theory of moral rights that Dworkin develops in various
parts of his book entails a limits thesis that both goes beyond the
position he takes in his discussion of Devlin and potentially provides
the kind of guidance to the voter-legislator that a limits thesis
should supply. Dworkin's outline of the implications of his theory
for the enforcement of morality also outlines his limits thesis. Since,
as I have said, I believe that the difficulties with the theory of moral
rights can be seen most clearly in the context of the enforcement of
morality, I shall examine Dworkin's theory in terms of the limits
thesis it entails. Thus in accordance with our examination of Dworkin's discussion of Devlin, we must assess his theory of moral rights
in terms of the guidance it offers to the voter-legislator about the
kinds of legislation that should be supported.
Dworkin's conclusions about the enforcement of morality can
be gathered from throughout his book. In his discussion of Devlin,
he cites approvingly "the belief that prejudices, personal aversions
and rationalizations do not justify restricting another's freedom" 5
and suggests that any existing consensus involving disapproval of
such things as homosexuality and pornography might be based upon
no more than such views.' Later, and more explicitly, Dworkin asserts that government "must not constrain liberty on the ground
that one citizen's conception of the good life of one group is nobler
or superior to another's."' 7 He goes on to claim that his theory of

moral rights can be used to support the idea "that we have distinct
rights to certain liberties like the liberty of free expression and of
free choice in personal and sexual relations."' Clearly, then, Dworkin does advocate a limits thesis. What now must be made clear is
how his theory of rights justifies the limits advocated.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The general basis of restrictions upon government, even government by majority rule, is the set of rights held by individuals. These
rights provide that certain kinds of actions taken against the holder
of the rights are unjustifiable even when they are taken through the
law.9 Dworkin interprets this concept of rights as grounding the
constitutional restrictions on majority rule, including, but not necessarily restricted to, the rights explicitly incorporated in the Constitution.10 This notion of rights advocates that claiming someone
has a right to do something is to claim more than "that it is the
'right' thing for him to do, or that he does no 'wrong' in doing it."I
Rather, it is to claim that "it would be wrong to interfere with his
doing it, or at least that some special grounds are needed for justifying any interference." 12 Consequently, a "right against the Government must be a right to do something even when the majority thinks
it would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be
worse off for having it done,' ' ' 3 and if someone has such a right,
"then it is wrong for the government to deny it to him even though
it would be in the general interest to do so."' 4 Dworkin's limits
thesis, then, asserts that certain kinds of legislation are unjustifiable because they violate the rights of individuals.
That Dworkin conceives of rights in this way, of course, does not
tell us what particular rights individuals have or why they have
them. The notion of individual rights must be given content before
it can do the work Dworkin assigns to it. One way in which Dworkin's notion of rights could be given content likely to support the
limits on law he advocates is through recognition of a general right
to liberty. This general right would create a presumption against the
justifiability of all interferences with liberty and thus, when coupled
with a denial that the majority's disapproval of some kind of behavior is sufficient reason to overcome the presumption, would serve as
the basis for opposing the enforcement of positive morality. This,
however, is not the move Dworkin makes. Indeed, he explicitly rejects the idea of a general right to liberty.
According to Dworkin, "it seems to me absurd to suppose that
men and women have any general right to liberty at all, at least as
liberty has traditionally been conceived by its champions.", 5 Dwor9. Id. at 133.
10. See id. at 133-34.
11. Id. at 188.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 194.
14. Id. at 269.
15. Id. at 267.
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kin rejects the concept of "liberty as license" or "the absence of
constraints placed by a government upon what a man might do if
he wants to."'" Among his reasons for rejecting the concept are that,
in the "all embracing sense of liberty as license, liberty and equality
are plainly in competition"'' 7 and that a right to liberty in the strong
sense of right necessary to do the work assigned to it in political
debate would have unacceptable consequences. The latter point
uses the concept that when "someone has a right to something, then
it is wrong for the government to deny it to him even though it would
be in the general interest to do so."' 8 Dworkin finds that a right to
liberty in this sense does not exist because it would mean that most
laws, including noncontroversial ones, violate individual rights,
since the "vast bulk of the laws which diminish my liberty are
justified on utilitarian grounds, as being in the general interest or
for the general welfare."' 9 For instance, laws that designate particular streets as one-way do not violate individual rights, but are justified merely on the ground that they are in the general interest. Since
this justification would be impossible were there a general right to
liberty in the strong sense, such a right must be rejected.
Having taken this position on the general right to liberty, Dworkin is left with the problem of explaining why he defends rights to
special kinds of liberty such as freedom of speech. The idea of a right
to liberty, he asserts, "provides too easy an answer to the question
of why we regard certain kinds of restraints, like the restraint on free
speech or the exercise of religion, as especially unjust.""0 Dworkin's
alternative answer is to defend specific forms of liberty by showing
their relationship to fundamental postulates of political morality.
The specific liberties that are required by fundamental moral principles are those to which individuals have rights.
In defending specific liberties, Dworkin's basic appeal is to the
concept of equality:
Government must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as human
beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, and with respect, that is,
as human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived. Government must not only treat people
with concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect. It must not
distribute goods or opportunities unequally on the ground that some citizens
are entitled to more because they are worthy of more concern. It must not
16.
17.

Id.
Id.

18. Id. at 269.
19.

Id.

20. Id. at 271.
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constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen's conception of the good life
of one group is nobler or superior to another's. These postulates, taken together, state what might be called the liberal conception of equality; but it is
a conception of equality, not of liberty as license, that they state.21

Characterizing these postulates of political morality as
"presum[ptions] that we all accept, 2 2 Dworkin argues that
"individual rights to distinct liberties must be recognized only when
the fundamental right to treatment as an equal can be shown to
2' 3
require these rights.
This approach suggests that particular liberties can be defended only by a showing that the fundamental right to treatment
as an equal requires them. Curiously, Dworkin does not do this. He
argues instead that restrictions on liberty are permissible only when
they can be justified in terms of certain limited types of arguments,
arguments of principle and arguments of policy. When the accepted
types of arguments do not apply, constraints on liberty are not
proper. Now a certain methodological advantage results from this
shift of emphasis on Dworkin's part. Had he followed through with
his attempt to show that the right to treatment as an equal requires
the various specific liberties that he defends, he might well have had
a difficult time. Plausibly an argument might be available that such
liberties as freedom of speech are essential to treatment as an equal.
Far less clear is the possibility of showing that treatment as an equal
requires protection of all the idiosyncratic forms of pleasure that
popularly might be thought of as immoral, but that would be protected under a view like Dworkin's that opposes the enforcement of
popular morality. Thus the shift of method contains an advantage
for Dworkin, but he buys it at the price of an unacknowledged
reliance on the importance of liberty as license. If constraints on
liberty are acceptable only when they are supported by certain kinds
of arguments of principle or policy, then clearly a presumption
arises against the permissiblity of all interferences with liberty.
Dworkin's argument assumes that all interferences with persons'
doing what they want require justification. Otherwise, he could not
claim that a "government that respects the liberal conception of
equality may properly constrain liberty only on certain very limited
types of justification. 21 4 Hence, Dworkin relies on a general right to
liberty as license in at least some sense, and it is not entirely clear
that traditional political theory has relied on anything stronger.
21.

Id. at 272-73.

22. Id. at 272.
23.

Id. at 273-74.

24. Id. at 274.
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Dworkin's presumption that interferences with liberty are unjustifiable potentially contradicts his rejection of the idea of a right
to liberty. The matter is not so clear-cut as this, however, for the
sorts of justifications that Dworkin allows as establishing the propriety of constraints on liberty include utilitarian justifications.
Hence, the presumption might not depend on a right to liberty in
Dworkin's strong sense, a right in this sense being something not
defeasible on merely utilitarian grounds, but it does depend on a
right to liberty that is stronger than Dworkin's weak sense of right,
which is a mere permission." Nevertheless, Dworkin avoids the contradiction if the presumption he uses is not a right in his strong
sense.
Dworkin, however, has not avoided the contradiction. The restraints he places on the use of utilitarian justifications for interferences with liberty reveal the contradiction between his presumption
against interferences with liberty and his rejection of a right to
liberty. He argues, for reasons that will be outlined shortly, that
some utilitarian justifications are unacceptable because they violate
the right to treatment as an equal. Although utilitarian arguments
do not necessarily conflict with this right, they might do so, and
when they do, the policies they are intended to defend are left without validity. This step in Dworkin's argument means, in fact, that
a demonstration that an interference with liberty has utilitarian
support is not enough to override the presumption against its justifiability. The presumption is overridden when the interference is defensible on utilitarian grounds provided that the interference does
not violate the right to treatment as an equal. In other words, to
show that an interference with liberty is justifiable, one must supplement a utilitarian argument with a demonstration that the right
to treatment as an equal is respected. If, however, this is Dworkin's
position, then he is committed to the existence of a right to liberty
in the stronger sense that he claims to reject. One has a right in this
stronger sense when utilitarian considerations are not enough to
justify denial of that to which one has a right. Dworkin's position,
however, is that utilitarian arguments are never enough, for nonviolation of the right to treatment as an equal is also necessary in every
case. Even when laws are justified solely on utilitarian
grounds-those, for example, establishing one-way streets-the
nonviolation of the right to treatment as an equal is assumed, for
surely Dworkin would be committed to rejecting such laws if they
25.

Id. at 188-89.
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did violate his right to equality. Thus the right to liberty presupposed by Dworkin's claim that government must justify its interference with liberty is a right to liberty in the stronger sense Dworkin
claims to reject.
The apparent failure of Dworkin's rejection of the right to liberty does not undermine his positive thesis. Indeed to me he is on
strong ground insofar as the idea behind his rejection of the right to
liberty is intended to reflect that the right to liberty requires interpretation through the use of other rights or values. That something
is an interference with liberty is not in itself, therefore, a decisive
objection since we often accept many kinds of interferences with
liberty. The exact dimensions of the right to liberty must be determined by references to something beyond liberty itself, and Dworkin's proposal of the right to treatment as an equal remains an
attractive possibility. His approach to delimiting the right to liberty
would clarify why the liberties placed beyond the law by a limits
thesis belong beyond the law's reach. To do this, he needs to show
that none of the acceptable arguments for restricting liberty succeeds when applied to the forms of liberty he wishes to defend.
Dworkin distinguishes three kinds of arguments, successful use
of which would show that particular kinds of constraints on liberty
are justifiable. These three types fall under two more general headings, arguments of policy and arguments of principle. "Arguments
of principle," Dworkin asserts, "are arguments intended to establish
an individual right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to
establish a collective goal." 26 Used specifically to support constraints on liberty, arguments of principle "support a particular
constraint on liberty on the argument that the constraint is required
to protect the distinct right of some individual who will be injured
by the exercise of the liberty," while arguments of policy support
constraints when they "are required to reach some overall political
goal, that is, to realize some state of affairs in which the community
as a whole, and not just certain individuals, are better off by virtue
of the constraint. 2 Arguments of policy are of two kinds, utilitarian
and ideal. Dworkin describes utilitarian arguments as those "that
the community as a whole will be better off because (to put the
point roughly) more of its citizens will have more of what they want
overall, even though some of them will have less."2 Ideal arguments
of policy are those "that the community will be better off, not be26. Id. at 90.
27.
28.

Id. at 274.
Id.
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cause more of its members will have more of what they want, but
because the community will be in some way closer to an ideal community, whether its members desire the improvement in question
2
or not." '

Justifying the enforcement of morality, in Dworkin's view,
would require that the necessary constraints be defensible on the
basis of one or more of these types of arguments. Defense of a limits
thesis thus requires an argument that the constraints are not supported by these kinds of arguments. Dworkin does not explicitly
address the possibility that the enforcement of morality might be
defended by an argument of principle, although his discussion of
Devlin's assertion of society's right to protect itself suggests that he
would deny that available evidence is sufficient to establish that
any rights are threatened by violations of popular morality." The
greatest threat to Dworkin's limits thesis, however, lies in his acceptance of utilitarian arguments of policy. His attempts to meet
this threat lead to the development of an interesting new twist in
the standard objection that utilitarianism permits violations of justice.
Utilitarian arguments are potentially damaging to Dworkin's
limits thesis because they are based upon the maximum satisfaction
of the preferences of most citizens. Utilitarian arguments will support any restrictions that satisfy more preferences than any alternative. Thus, the prohibition of private conduct thought to be immoral
would be justified if the prohibition satisfied enough preferences.
Dworkin responds to this problem not by denying that utilitarian
arguments could lead to such consequences, but rather by claiming
that the arguments that would have these results are in violation of
the fundamental right to treatment as an equal. In other words,
although utilitarian arguments do constitute a legitimate and important mode of political argument, they must be constrained by
the right to equality.
Dworkin's position is that utilitarian arguments in themselves
do not violate the right to treatment as an equal. On the contrary,
they embody characteristics that give the appearance of respecting
that right. In the calculation of preference satisfaction, everyone's
preferences count and count equally. Hence, a utilitarian argument
seems to embody perfectly the right to equal concern and respect,
because no one is granted preferential treatment in the evaluation
of competing alternatives. Dworkin, therefore, must show that at
29. Id.
30. See id. at 242-46.
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least some utilitarian arguments, those supporting policies such as
the enforcement of the positive morality that he opposes, violate the
right to treatment as an equal. He does this by distinguishing between personal preferences and external preferences. The personal
preferences of an individual are those that "state a preference for
the assignment of one set of goods or opportunities to him, while
external preferences "state a preference for one assignment of goods
or opportunities to others."' When a utilitarian argument relies on
external preferences, Dworkin believes, it violates the right of persons to be treated as equals. It does so because of the way in which
the counting of external preferences distorts the weight given to the
preferences of those who are subjects of the external preferences.
They count for less simply because they are disapproved by others.
Let me quote one of Dworkin's examples dealing with the enforcement of morality:
Suppose ... that many members of the community disapprove on moral
grounds of homosexuality, or contraception, or pornography, or expressions of
adherence to the Communist party. They prefer not only that they themselves
do not indulge in these activities, but that no one else does so either, and they
believe that a community that permits rather than prohibits these acts is
inherently a worse community. These are external preferences, but, once
again, they are no less genuine, nor less a source of pleasure when satisfied and
displeasure when ignored, than purely personal preferences. Once again, however, if these external preferences are counted, so as to justify a constraint on
liberty, then those constrained suffer, not simply because their personal preferences have lost in a competition for scarce resources with the personal preferences of others, but precisely because
their conception of a proper or desirable
32
form of life is despised by others.

Hence, utilitarian arguments that count external preferences violate
the right to treatment as an equal and for that reason cannot be
accepted as justifying the policies they are intended to support.
Interpreting the exact nature of the violation that results from
the counting of external preferences poses some difficulty. On the
one hand, Dworkin's description of the problem suggests that the
violation of equality consists in "a form of double counting" 33 that
allows those with external preferences to be counted twice in the
overall calculation, once for their personal preferences and once for
their external preferences. An analogy might be drawn to a referendum in which some voters are allowed to vote not only on the issue
in question, but also on whose vote should count. For example,
members of Group A vote not only for Policy A but also against
31. Id. at 275 (emphasis supplied).
32. Id. at 275-76.
33. Id. at 235.
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counting the votes of members of Group B, who vote only on the
policy question. Members of the latter group clearly are not treated
as equals. Accordingly, Dworkin's objection might be put in this
way: Utilitarian arguments that count external preferences embody
a kind of "one preference, one vote" approach that allows those with
external preferences to exercise greater influence in the overall calculation of utilities than those without. This cannot be correct,
however, or at least it does not capture everything Dworkin intends
by his objection to utilitarianism. This is shown by the way in which
Dworkin applies the objection to the use of democratic procedures
in the calculation of utilities. "Democracy cannot discriminate," he
asserts, "within the overall preferences imperfectly revealed by voting, distinct personal and external components, so as to provide a
method for enforcing the former while ignoring the latter. ' 34 The
objection is not that some are given more votes than others, but that
external preferences influence the direction of the single votes than
those with external preferences, like all others, have. Since a "one
man, one vote" approach is also subject to Dworkin's objection, the
objection must involve more than the first interpretation we have
considered.
On the other hand, there must be a way of understanding the
violation of equality that explains the way in which democratic
procedures (used from the voter-legislator perspective) violate it.
The evil that Dworkin sees in the use of one-man-one-vote democracy to calculate utility lies in its failure to exclude the possibility
that the votes of some reflect external preferences. The vote of the
racist, for instance, reflects a hatred for the members of certain
races and a view of them as inferior. If this is the problem with
democratic procedures, however, then the villains who cause such
procedures to violate the right to treatment as an equal are the
individuals who vote on the basis of their external preferences. They
are the ones who view some persons as worthy of less concern and
respect than others and, because their votes are based on that view,
the outcome is corrupted by a failure to treat everyone as equals.
Suppose now that someone tries to use the utilitarian approach
to decide what legislation he should support. Further suppose that
he is aware of the double-counting problem present in the onepreference-one-vote method of calculating utility, but that because
he wishes to use a method that treats everyone as equals he rejects
that method. He next considers the possibility of using the one34.

Id. at 276.
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man-one-vote method of calculating utility and is met with Dworkin's argument that this method also violates the right to equality.
Would this person actually be failing to treat everyone as equals by
using the method? Assuming that those who base their votes upon
external preferences fail to treat disapproved groups as equals, does
this necessarily mean that someone else who allows these external
preferences to count in a one-man-one-vote calculation of utility
also fails to treat everyone as equals? That person, in trying to
decide what policy to support, views everyone as equals in that he
takes the satisfaction of the preferences of each equally into consideration. He gives each an equal vote and does not allow his own
external preferences, if he has them, to influence the outcome.
Moreover, if he were to attempt to eliminate this influence from his
calculations of the external preferences of others, the elimination
itself would be an exercise of an external preference. In other words,
his method of calculating utility would be based upon an evaluation
of the propriety of the voting preferences of others. The exclusion
of the votes of those who vote because of external preferences would
be a failure to treat them with equal respect. Consequently, the only
way that our imaginary utilitarian could make his calculations
without violating the right to treatment as an equal would be to use
the one-man-one-vote method of calculating utility. Use of the onepreference-one-vote method would fail to treat all persons as equals,
and any attempt to exclude votes based on external preferences
would fail as well, for it would fail to treat those voters with equal
respect.
If Dworkin thus fails to show that the one-man-one-vote
method of calculating utility violates the right to treatment as an
equal, he loses the basis of his argument against justifying the enforcement of popular morality, racist policies, and whatever else
might be favored by a majority. His weapon against these is the
right to treatment as an equal, but that weapon does not prevail.
This, of course, means that utilitarian thinking might not be objectionable in every way that Dworkin claims it to be. Another conclusion equally well supported and more important to those of us who
share Dworkin's concern that the rights of persons be protected is
that this right to treatment as an equal is not an adequate basis for
moral rights: If a stronger ground could be defined, good reason
would still exist for supposing that the rights of persons preclude the
kinds of legislation sometimes called for by popular morality, such
as racism and so on. This tentative conclusion is bolstered by an
examination of the other kind of policy argument Dworkin recognizes, the ideal argument of policy.
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Ideal arguments of policy, again, are arguments that support
policies on the ground that they will bring the community closer to
the ideal community, regardless of whether this is desired by members of the community. To such arguments, Dworkin claims that the
following limits apply:
The liberal conception of equality sharply limits the extent to which ideal
arguments of policy may be used to justify any constraint on liberty. Such
arguments cannot be used if the idea in question is itself controversial within
the community. Constraints cannot be defended, for example, directly on the
ground that they contribute to a culturally sophisticated community, whether
the community wants the sophistication or not, because that argument would
violate the canon of the liberal conception of equality that prohibits a government from relying on the claim that certain forms of life are inherently more
valuable than others.-

Given this constraint on the use of ideal arguments, such arguments
can support coercion only when the goal is not opposed by some
members of the community, although the goal need not be supported by community members. Dworkin apparently thinks that
this is enough to prevent justification of the enforcement of popular
morality, at least when controversy exists about the moral judgments involved.
Consideration of other implications of Dworkin's restriction
casts further doubt on his view. The worry is that the restrictions
might prevent legitimate and necessary forms of coercion, because
virtually anything could become controversial within the community. Thus its prohibition would become suspect in Dworkin's
view. Far-fetched examples are not necessary to illustrate this possibility. Suppose that some extreme racist organization were to become influential in the community and that the tenets of the organization included the belief that the murder of members of disapproved races is desirable and praiseworthy. In this situation, the
question whether killing members of certain races is wrong would
be controversial within the community. Surely the conclusion that
the government should stop enforcing the prohibition on killing
members of these races or that any individual should withdraw his
or her support for the enforcement of that prohibition does not follow from this controversy. Yet the enforcement of this law does seem
to indicate a reliance on the claim that the moral position of the
racist group is an inferior one. Enforcement of the prohibition
against racist murder thus would appear to be a violation of Dworkin's demand that everyone be treated with equal concern and respect, since the racist group is not treated with equal respect. The
35. Id. at 274.
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only apparent solution would be to admit that enforcing views controversial within the community does not necessarily violate the
right to treatment as an equal and thus cannot necessarily be ruled
out.
Nevertheless, something about the attempt to preclude governmental intervention in matters of a controversial nature is quite
appealing. Because the preclusion shows respect for each individual
by allowing him or her to form a judgment and to act on it without
being faced with external threats, we may want to retain the idea if
possible. On the other hand, because we do not want to say that the
existence of controversy always precludes governmental intervention, as in the racist murder case, retaining the idea is difficult. I
submit that perhaps the reference to an issue as controversial within
the community is a reference to the wrong source of controversy or
to the wrong kind of controversy. Let me suggest an example. The
question of abortion is, of course, an issue that remains controversial
within the American community. The abortion issue is not only
controversial in the sense that many people hold conflicting opinions about it; it is also controversial because no position on the
morality of abortion is clearly more reasonable than several others.
For instance, no reason appears to be compelling for picking any
particular point in the developmental process of the human being
as the point at which terminating the developing entity becomes a
violation of rights. The issue is one that objective arguments seem
incapable of resolving. When an issue is controversial in this sense,
governmental enforcement of one of the competing views takes the
decision out of the hands of the individual without any objective
justification. On the other hand, if the government fails to enforce
any of the competing views, it does not fail to protect any rights that
do have a sound basis. For example, if the government prohibited
abortion, it would be taking sides on an issue when no clear reason
exists for regarding any position as more defensible than another.
A failure to prohibit abortion, on the other hand, is not a failure to
protect soundly grounded rights. In contrast, the failure to protect
the rights of a group threatened with death on racist grounds would
be a failure to protect soundly based rights, for there would be no
doubt about the irrationality of the racist group's reasons for denying protection to some while accepting it for others. Thus the government ought not to constrain liberty on grounds that are
rationally controversial and that may capture what is attractive
about Dworkin's position without adopting its undesirable consequences.
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This way of understanding opposition to governmental intervention into controversial issues may salvage Dworkin's objection to
using utilitarian arguments that would result in the enforcement of
morality. If the moralistic legislation in question is noncontroversial, refusing to allow the views of those who are noncontroversially
wrong to influence the vote would not violate equality. If the legislation is controversial, however, governmental intervention would violate the right to equality because a governmental stand on a controversial issue would deprive individuals of the right to act on their
own decisions and would not be based upon sufficient justification.
Closer examination reveals, however, that this approach is unsuccessful. Consider the case in which the legislation in question is
rationally controversial. For instance, suppose that it is rationally
controversial whether homosexual conduct is immoral. Given this
assumption, the prohibition of homosexual conduct would fail to
allow each person to reach his or her own decision about the matter,
a failure without justification since, ex hypothesi, the immorality of
homosexual conduct is rationally controversial. If, however, a sufficiently large segment of the community disapproves of homosexuality, a one-man-one-vote utilitarian argument could be made in favor
of prohibiting homosexual conduct. If such an argument were available, Dworkin could not justifiably oppose the prohibition. Neither
could he oppose the one-man-one-vote method of calculating utility
in this instance because the issue is rationally controversial and
because in such cases the excluding of some persons' votes would fail
to treat them with equal respect. He also could not oppose the
prohibition on the ground that it would involve an arbitrary governmental position, for the existence of the utilitarian argument for
prohibition makes the prohibition nonarbitrary. The government's
position would be that, although no objective reason exists for believing that the antihomosexual forces are correct in their view of
homosexual conduct, the concern for utility is an objective reason
for the prohibition. Since Dworkin permits constraints on liberty to
be justified on utilitarian grounds absent a violation of equality, the
prohibition would go through. The controversial nature of the issue
precludes the possibility of a sound rights-based objection to prohibition, so the utilitarian support for the prohibition is decisive.
Dworkin thus has not shown why utilitarian arguments of this sort
would not justify the enforcement of popular morality.
A similar difficulty remains concerning Dworkin's position on
the use of ideal arguments of policy. The rational controversy argument precludes the establishment of constraints on liberty only
when the basis of the proposed constraint is rationally controversial.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:450

Although his view thus permits the use of ideal arguments to justify
constraints on liberty if the ideal is not rationally controversial, it
does not provide sufficient protection from governmentally imposed
interferences. The trouble is that constraints on liberty are not always justifiable even for the sake of an ideal that is not rationally
controversial. Presumably it is not rationally controversial (or, if
this seems doubtful for some reason, suppose for the sake of discussion that it has been shown to be rationally noncontroversial) that
an ideal society would be free of persons with certain kinds of racist
or sexist attitudes. Dworkin's position seems to allow constraints on
liberty that would be justifiable for the sake of bringing society
closer to this ideal, since it is, ex hypothesi, a noncontroversial ideal,
and the pursuit of it would not violate the right to treatment as an
equal. Yet in general we do not think the imposition of constraints
on liberty to be justifiable merely because they would be effective
in achieving a prejudice-free society. Surely the locking away of
those who express their prejudices in ways that influence others to
share them would facilitate that end. Presumably the prohibiting
of prejudiced persons from raising children and thereby from passing on their prejudices also would be effective in eliminating societal
prejudice. A theory that precludes the enforcement of morality,
however, would not permit this kind of constraint on liberty for the
mere expression of prejudice. Acting on the prejudice in ways that
would violate others' rights could be prohibited, but not just any
constraint that would effectively bring about the goal would be
permitted. Ideal arguments of policy thus also would permit constraints on liberty in at least some instances in which they are quite
questionable.
Both kinds of policy arguments, utilitarian and ideal, would
permit constraints on liberty in dubious instances in which Dworkin
himself seems not to want to permit them. Utilitarian arguments
could support the enforcement of popular morality on rationally
controversial issues, and ideal arguments could support constraints
on liberty on the insufficient ground that the constraints would help
to bring about the ideal. Because Dworkin himself tries to refute the
utilitarian arguments and proposes that ideal arguments not be
used when the ideal is actually controversial in the community,
clearly he agrees that these are instances in which constraints on
liberty should not be imposed. The basic trouble is that the right
to treatment as an equal is not sufficiently restrictive to prevent
these uses of arguments of policy. Two relevant aspects of the right
to treatment as an equal are direct consequences of the right to
equal respect. One is the requirement that each person be counted
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equally or have an equal influence in decisions affecting the community. The other is that persons not be treated in ways that deny
their capacity for forming intelligent conceptions of how life should
be lived. Utilitarian arguments influenced by external preferences
satisfy these requirements when the issue in question is rationally
controversial, and ideal arguments that are actually controversial in
the community satisfy these requirements when the issue is not
rationally controversial, since as we have seen, constraints on liberty
for the sake of actually, but not rationally, controversial reasons
cannot be ruled out. The right to treatment as an equal, therefore,
does not provide sufficient protection to serve as the foundation of
moral rights.
All of this makes the idea of a right to liberty very attractive.
If Dworkin's theory does not provide adequate safeguards against
constraints on liberty, surely the recognition of a strong right to
liberty would do so. As an attempt to provide a satisfactory theory
of moral rights, however, an appeal to a right to liberty would present serious difficulties. Liberty must be granted sufficient weight
that it is not overcome merely because an argument of policy supports its constraint. If this result were sought by means of a right
to liberty independent of and in competition with other rights, the
consequence would be a theory of rights that fails to explain why
any particular set of rights exists and why those rights have just the
implications they are claimed to have. Suppose, for instance, that
Dworkin's right to treatment as an equal were supplemented with
a right to liberty, as apparently it must be. This would not explain
why we have these two rights and no others, and perhaps more
important, it would not explain which right must give way when the
rights fall into competition. On the other hand, we have seen the
need for some right to liberty to explain some of our particular
judgments and some of Dworkin's own arguments. This indicates a
further reason why the right to treatment as an equal does not
provide a plausible foundation for moral rights since it cannot explain the role of the right to liberty that must be recognized. To
explain that, to explain the right to treatment as an equal, and to
explain the interrelationships of these and other rights, requires
something more basic.
Dworkin touches on an alternative basis for rights, but passes
over it with little comment:
Anyone who professes to take rights seriously, and who praises our Government
for respecting them, must have some sense of what [the point of the institution
of rights] is. He must accept, at the minimum, one or both of two important
ideas. The first is the vague but powerful idea of human dignity. This idea,
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associated with Kant, but defended by philosophers of different schools, supposes that there are ways of treating a man that are inconsistent with recognizing him as a full member of the human community, and holds that such
treatment is profoundly unjust."

Rather than pursuing this idea, Dworkin works out his theory of
rights using the idea of equality. Since the idea of equality fails to
serve as a satisfactory foundation for rights, further exploration of
the idea of human dignity seems in order. I shall conclude by indicating some directions that this idea might take.
The Kantian idea of human dignity, of persons as ends in themselves, 7 provides an intuitively plausible basis for the two competing and independent rights used by Dworkin, the right to equality
and the right to liberty. Equal concern and respect clearly is embodied in the idea of treating each person with the dignity owed to every
human being, but the Kantian idea is not limited to that. A right
to liberty is a plausible consequence as well, for the refusal to allow
a person to order his life as he chooses can be one kind of assault
upon human dignity. Thus this Kantian idea potentially harmonizes the two rights and helps resolve the problems that arise when
the two rights appear to conflict. Although vague, the Kantian concept of moral personhood seems to form a sounder basis for our
thinking about rights than Dworkin's reliance upon the idea of
equality.
Use of the Kantian concept of human dignity as the foundation
of moral rights offers all of the advantages that the right to equality
provides in that role but, with one possible exception, without its
limitations. Since the Kantian concept is a possible basis for a right
to liberty, a theory of rights based upon the Kantian concept might
be subject to the difficulties Dworkin identifies with the idea of a
right to liberty. The problem is that the idea of a right to liberty
puts severe constraints on the use of policy arguments, and as Dworkin has shown, many innocuous laws are based upon policy considerations. The question about the status of arguments of policy in a
theory of rights grounded in the Kantian concept of human dignity
is not an especially difficult one to overcome.
Policy arguments could be accommodated into a Kantian
theory of rights in at least two ways. First, arguments of policy could
be subsumed under the heading of arguments of principle. This
subsumption could be achieved by demonstrating that respecting
the rights of persons sometimes requires constraints on liberty cho36. Id. at 198.
37. For Kant's discussion of the concept of persons as ends in themselves, see I. KANT,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 25-27, 108-11, 114-16, 237-39 (W. Hastie transl. 1887).
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sen on the basis of policy considerations. One can see roughly how
this might go by referring to the example of traffic regulations. Such
regulations are necessary to prevent the use of automobiles from
seriously increasing the risks to pedestrians and other motorists.
Because the regulatory details are not determined by this need to
prevent injury, policy considerations could play a derivative role. In
short, the idea is that persons sometimes might have a right to
pursue goals that are supported by utilitarian or ideal arguments.
Second, although arguments of policy would retain their status
as independent of arguments of principle, with respect to some matters the right to liberty properly could be overcome by arguments
of policy. Defending these constraints on liberty by showing that
they do not violate any rights would still be necessary, but giving a
positive defense of the constraint on the basis of rights would not
be necessary. Because some arguments of policy cannot be accepted
as justifying constraints on liberty, however, this approach would
involve distinguishing different spheres in which the presumption
against constraints on liberty differs in its weight. The result would
be a sphere in which only arguments of principle could justify constraints on liberty and another in which both arguments of principle
and arguments of policy could justify constraints.
To me the formulation of some theory of rights capable of doing
the work Dworkin assigns to his theory of rights is entirely possible.
Such a theory might support conclusions very similar to Dworkin's
on the issues of the enforcement of morality, civil disobedience, and
reverse discrimination. I have argued, however, that Dworkin's version of such a theory fails to do the necessary work, in part because
his arguments concerning the right to liberty and the use of utilitarian and ideal arguments of policy are unsuccessful, but basically
because the foundation of rights he proposes is inadequate. Nonetheless, the foregoing remarks should be taken as attempts to contribute to the structure that Dworkin builds, rather than as attempts to bring it down.

